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INTRODUCTION 
Amina Lawal is a thirty-one year old illiterate, unemployed 
mother of three children. 1 She has been married and divorced 
twice.2 Amina was living in her father's house in Kurami, 
Nigeria, when a fellow villager reported that Amina's youngest 
daughter, Wasila was born out of wedlock. 3 At that point, 
Amina' s life was forever changed. 
The Islamic court charged Amina with adultery and she 
confessed, although having a daughter born more than nine 
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Syracuse University College of Law; B.A. Political Science St. 
Michael's College, 2001. Special thanks to Professor Leslie Bender for her time, 
commitment, and assistance with this article, and to the staff of the Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce, especially the editorial board, for their hard work and 
dedication. 
1. David Finkel, Adultery's Cost: Death by Stoning, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002. 
2. Id. 
3. Amnesty International UK, Save Amina From Death by Stoning [hereinafter 
Amnesty International UK], at http://www.mertonai.org/amina/amina.asp (last visited Mar. 
21, 2004 and the hard copy is available in the Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce office). 
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months after divorcing was proof of her crime.4 The man that 
Amina identified as Wasila's father, Yahaya Muhammad, denied 
the charge and swore on the Koran that he was innocent. 5 
Muhammad escaped conviction because the prosecution could not 
produce four eyewitnesses to the fornication, the necessary burden 
of proof under Islamic law for a male.6 Amina was not as 
fortunate. 
On March 22, 2002, the Shari' a court at Bakori in Katsina 
State sentenced Amina to death by stoning for her act of adultery.7 
The court scheduled Amina's execution for spring 2004, when 
Wasila stopped breastfeeding. 8 Death by stoning involves the 
burying of the person to their neck in the ground and then 
continuous stoning to the head until death. 9 On August 19, 2002, 
an Islamic high court in Nigeria rejected Amina's appeal and 
instead upheld her sentence to death by stoning for having had sex 
out of wedlock. 10 
On January 23, 2003, the Shari'a court of appeals grand khadi 
(chief judge) refused to comment on her guilt or innocence. I I 
However, the judge did state, "The best deterrent is the death 
sentence, for people to see what happens to a fornicator. They 
watch you be stoned to death. They wouldn't want it to happen to 
them."I2 The judge went on to say, "[t]his case is an ordinary 
case, as simple as drinking water." 13 Amina's case was adjourned 
for another two months after only ten minutes of deliberations. 14 
On September 25, 2003, the Shari'a Court of Appeal in 
Nigeria overturned Amina's conviction. 15 The court held the 
4. Amnesty International UK, supra note 3; Finkel, supra note 1. 
5. Finkel, supra note 1. 
6. Id. 
7. Bianca Jagger, All Miss World contestants must quit now; only a complete boycott 
can bring Nigeria to its senses, THE LONDON EVENING STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2002. 
8. Finkel, supra note 1. 
9. Amnesty International UK, supra note 3; JeffKoinage, Woman Sentenced to Stoning 
Freed, CNN, Sept. 26, 2003 at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/09/25/nigeria.stoning/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Woman Freed]. 
10. Associated Press, Court Upholds Stoning For Nigerian Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2002 [hereinafter AP, Ct. Upholds]. 
11. Somini Sengupta, As Stoning Case Proceeds, Nigeria Stands Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 




15. Woman Freed, supra note 9. 
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conviction invalid because Amina was pregnant when Shari' a was 
implemented in her province and other procedural errors. 16 In his 
opinion, Judge Ibrahim Mai-Unguwa found Shari'a to be 
interpreted as allowing up to five years for gestation, providing 
for the possibility that Amina's ex-husband of two years could 
have been Wasila's father. 17 Had the Court of Appeals affirmed 
her conviction and sentence to stoning, Amina would have had 
two additional appeals to Nigerian federal courts, which are not 
governed by Shari' a. 18 
Twelve Nigerian states have put Islamic Law (Shari'a) into 
practice since the implementation of civilian rule, which replaced 
military dictatorship in 1999 .19 Amina is the second woman to be 
convicted of having sex out of wedlock; the first was Safiya 
Hussiaini who had also been sentenced to death by stoning.20 On 
March 26, 2002, a high court in Lagos, Nigeria acquitted 
Hussiaini due to lack of evidence based upon the admission by her 
ex-husband that he had fathered the child.21 
This article follows Amina Lawal' s story to illustrate the 
inability of international law to protect the rights of women. In 
just over three years, four people in northern Nigeria have been 
sentenced to death for adultery, and one convicted murderer was 
hanged.22 In 2000, a teenager was publicly flogged for the crime 
of adultery after three men raped her.23 If Amina's conviction had 
been upheld, she would have been the first to be executed for 
adultery since the implementation of Shari'a in Nigeria. 24 Her 
death would have likely added fuel to an already incendiary civil 
conflict between the northern Shari' a states and the southern 
democratic states. 25 In order to understand how Shari' a came to 
power in Nigeria, it is important to understand the history of 
16. Associated Press, Nigerian Woman Avoids Stoning Death, U.S.A. Today, Sept. 25, 
2003, available at www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-25-niger-stoning_x.htm (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter AP, Woman Avoids]. 
17. Id. 
18. Woman Freed, supra note 9. 
19. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10. 
20. Associated Press, Nigerian Woman Condemned to Death by Stoning is Acquitted, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002. [hereinafter AP, Nigerian Woman]. 
21. Id. 
22. Finkel, supra note 1. 
23. Natasha Walter, Beauty and the Beasts, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Nov. 8, 2002. 
24. Sengupta, supra note 11. 
25. Id. 
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political unrest that has plagued the country since 
decolonialization. 
Part I of this article develops Nigeria's history of political 
unrest and deeply divided Muslim and Christian population 
resulting in the recent emergence of religious governance by 
Shari'a Law. Part II describes current international law as well as 
Nigeria's international commitments under three specific treaties. 
The three treaties discussed are the Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), the 
Optional Protocol to CEDA W ("The Protocol"), and the 
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"). Part III details 
how Shari'a Law conflicts with Nigeria's commitments under the 
treaties and what enforcement mechanisms have failed to allow 
for such insubordination. 
Finally, Part IV of this article sets forth proposals for the 
future of international law. These proposals include how the 
international community can alter treaties and the treaty 
reservation process to better effectuate the goals they set forth. 
These suggestions will be applied to Amina Lawal to demonstrate 
how such changes could have saved her from her sentenced 
execution. 
I. NIGERIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY 
On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent country 
by an act of the British Parliament.26 Britain had controlled 
Nigeria since its colonization of the protectorate in 1861.27 As a 
result of the colonization, the official language is English.28 Since 
decolonialization, Nigeria has experienced many systems of 
government. 29 Following independence, a democratic 
26. The History of Nigeria accessed through the Library of Congress, available at 
http://memoryJoe.gov/ cgi-bin/ query /r?frd/ cstdy:@field(DOCID+ng003 3) (last visited Apr. 
10, 2004 )[hereinafter History]. 
27. Associated Press, Time line of Nigerian Government, BBC, January 10, 
2001.[hereinafter AP, Timeline] 
28. History, supra note 26. 
29. See generally, Ema Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A 
Universal Human Rights Perspective, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 431 (2001) (discussing how 
Nigeria's history of political unrest has influenced its present views on human rights); See 
also, Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform 
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2002) (discussing the history of political 
corruption within the Nigerian government). 
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parliamentary system with a prime minister and a governor 
general was established. 30 The governor general was much like 
the British monarch and performed essentially ceremonial tasks, 
whereas the prime minister was charged with leading state 
affairs. 31 The parliament was composed of a House of 
Representatives, with 312 members, and a Senate, with 44 
members.32 The public elected all members of the House and all 
Senators were chosen by regional legislatures. 33 
There were two main parties that appeared during the first 
few years following independence: the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons ("NCNC") and the Northern Peoples' 
Congress ("NPC"). 34 These conflicting parties were heavily 
represented in the country's first election in 1964. 35 Conflicts 
arose because the three major ethnic tribes, The Hausa in the 
north, The Ibo in the east, and the Yoruba in the south and west 
refused to work together. 36 Civil wars in the east led to a military 
administration taking over in 1966.37 That same year the 
constitution was amended to remove the supremacy of the 
constitution as the law of the land. 38 This provision ended the 
federal court's ability to entertain questions of constitutional 
human rights violations by subsequent legislation. 39 
Current Nigerian President, Olusengun Obasanjo, military 
dictator from 1976 to 1979, was the only dictator able to return 
the country to civilian control.40 The military retained power in 
Nigeria despite multiple coups and assassination of leaders.41 In 
1995, the European Union imposed a three-year sanction against 
Nigeria for its gross human rights violations.42 In 1999, 




34. 0. Igho Natufe, Ph.D., Midwest State and the Future of Nigerian Federalism, 
available at http://www.dawodu.net/igho.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
35. Id. 
36. Joel E. Starr, "What Do You Have For Me Today?" Observing the 1999 Nigerian 
Presidential Election, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 390-91 (1999). 
37. History, supra note 26. 
38. Christian N. Okeke, International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, 27 CAL. W. 
INT'L L.J. 311, 340 (1997). 
39. Id. 
40. Starr, supra note 36, at 391. 
41. History, supra note 26. 
42. AP, Timeline, supra note 27. 
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democratic elections in parliament and the presidency brought the 
election of Obasanjo and, at the same time, Islamic law was 
reintroduced in the northern Nigerian states.43 Although the two 
events occurred within the same year, Obasanjo did not facilitate 
the introduction of Shari' a law, it was a result of the Muslim 
dominance in the northern states.44 At the time of the election, 
Nigeria had a fifty percent literacy rate and, of the 107 million 
residents, sixty percent were registered voters.45 However, only 
fifty percent of the registered voters turned out to vote in the 1999 
election. 46 
The Nigerian Constitution was redrafted in 1999 .47 There are 
two sections of the Constitution that created tension surrounding 
the implementation of Shari' a. First, the Constitution does not 
allow for the death penalty or torture: 
Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived 
intentionally of his life ... every individual is entitled to respect for the 
dignity of his person, and accordingly ... no Eerson shall be subject to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. 8 
Therefore, the punishment of execution that Shari' a 
proscribes is unconstitutional. 
Second, the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to 
freely practice their chosen religion as proscribed by their holy 
books: 
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in 
private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.49 
The holy book of Islam, the Koran, directs its followers on 
how to behave and what the repercussions are for 
43. AP, Timeline, supra note 27. 
44. Id. 
45. Starr, supra note 36, at 390-91. 
46. Id. at 397. 
47. See generally, Jennifer Tyus, Going too Far: Extending Shari'a Law in Nigeria 
from Personal to Public Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 199 (2004) (comparing the 
Constitution of Nigeria to that of other predominantly Muslim states). 
48. NIG. CONST. ch. IV, §§ 33(1), 34(1), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ConstitutionOITheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) 
[hereinafter Constitution]. 
49. Id. at §38(1). 
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noncompliance. 50 
Furthermore, the Islamic courts are recognized by the 
Constitution in chapter VII, the Judicature. 51 The scope of the 
Islamic court's power is enumerated and includes topics such as 
marriage, guardianship of the infirmed, and succession of 
property. 52 The final appeal for all cases heard by the Islamic 
courts resides in the highest court for Nigeria, the Federal High 
Court. 53 The complicated web of Islamic and federal courts may 
become the focal point for confrontation between religion and 
democratic rule. 
Nigerian President Obasanjo received considerable pressure 
from the international community against the use of Shari' a in the 
twelve northern states. 54 This pressure stems from the fact that 
civil conflict has taken the lives of more than 10,000 Nigerians 
since Obasanjo' s election in 1999. 55 The government has 
reluctantly declared its official condemnation for the use of harsh 
punishments under Shari' a, but has yet to take affirmative action 
to prevent their application. 56 While the government sat idle, the 
opposition to Shari' a has sparked violence throughout the country 
resulting in over two thousand deaths in two years. 57 Supporters 
of Shari' a allege a violation of their religious rights and claim that 
non-Muslims have a separate court system and, therefore, no right 
to interfere. 58 Opponents to Shari' a point to the egregious human 
rights violations and constitutional violations, combined with the 
50. See generally, Karima Benrioune As-Sa/mu' Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in 
Islamic Jurisprudence 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 605 (1994) (discussing the role of Islamic Law 
in principles of contemporary humanitarian law); Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need World's 
Collide: The Hadad Crimes of Islamic Law & International Human Rights, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. 
R.Ev. 43 (2000) (illustrating how crime and punishment under Islamic law compare with 
international human rights law); Joelle Entelis, International Human Right: Islam's Friend 
or Foe?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1251 (1997) (discussing international human rights for 
women as illustrated by the enforcement of Islamic law in Algeria). 
51. See generally, NIG. CONST., supra note 49, ch. VII. 
52. Id. at §262(2). 
53. Id. 
54. Walter, supra note 23. 
55. Associated Press, Nigerian Oil Crisis Worsens, CNN.COM, Mar. 23, 2003. 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/03/23/nigeria.oilnew/index.html. 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004). [hereinafter AP, Oil Crises]. 
56. Walter, supra note 23. 
57. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10. 
58. Associated Press, Nigeria Shari'a Architect Defends Law, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21, 
2002. 
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lack of government response as justification for intervention. 59 
In November 2002, the clash between Muslim and Christian 
states erupted in the capital city of Abuja as the Miss World 
Pageant was scheduled to take place there in December.60 
Contestants boycotted the event as a means of drawing attention to 
the treatment of women in the Shari'a states.61 The pageant 
became a world stage for international protest for human rights.62 
Over a hundred people were killed in riots that erupted after a 
newspaper suggested the Prophet Mohammed would have 
approved of the Miss World Pageant and likely chosen a wife 
from among the contestants. 63 Mobs of protestors looted shops, 
smashed windows, and burned churches and mosques, while 
stabbing, bludgeoning, and burning bystanders.64 As a result of 
the violent reaction by the northern Shari' a states and the inability 
of the government to control the situation, the organizers of the 
pageant relocated to London. 65 
Consequently, the Miss World Pageant highlighted Amina 
Lawal' s story and the general disparate treatment of women under 
Shari' a law into an international arena. Amnesty International 
launched an international campaign opposing Shari' a and 
condemning the harsh punishments as "gender persecution" and 
"discriminatory punishment that deliberately flouts the Nigerian 
constitution."66 Human rights groups worldwide allege that the 
imposition of Shari'a violates Nigeria's commitments under 
international law, and, therefore, the international community has 
a right and duty to intervene.67 
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
International human rights law began with the establishment 
59. Ema Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human 
Rights Perspective, 25 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 431 (2001 ). 
60. Walter, supra note 23. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Associated Press, Miss World Leaves Nigeria, CNN, Nov. 22, 2002. available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/11/22/nigeria.missworld/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter AP, Miss World Leaves Nigeria]. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10. 
67. See generally Women Freed, supra note 9. 
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of the United Nations on October 24, 1945.68 On that date, 
representatives from fifty countries came together in San 
Francisco to develop the Charter of the United Nations.69 The 
purpose set forth in the United Nations Charter is to promote and 
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 70 The 
drafters of the U .N. Charter clearly stated that the provisions of 
the Charter apply to all states, even non-member states, as far as 
may be necessary to maintain international peace and security. 71 
There are currently one hundred ninety-one member states of the 
United Nations, including Nigeria, which became a member on 
October 7, 1960. 72 
The United Nations is the primary international organization 
originally designed to prevent military confrontations among its 
members. 73 The General Assembly is the principal decision-
making body and is comprised of representatives from all member 
states, each having one vote.74 All treaties come before the 
General Assembly for deliberation and approval. 75 
Over the last fifty years, the United Nations has focused 
increasingly on the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all. 76 These goals are effectuated through the 
creation and adoption of international agreements.77 Human rights 
treaties are unique due to the lack of direct advantages or 
disadvantages to state parties. 78 There is no direct advantage to 
the state because the citizens are the beneficiaries; and there is no 
direct disadvantage if another state party stipulates a reservation 
because the citizens of the reserving state will be impacted, not 
68. About the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm. 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004)[hereinafter About the UN]. 
69. About the UN, supra note 68. 
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. 
71. Id. art. 2, para. 6. 
72. List of Member States, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html. 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
73. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 505-06 (3d ed. 
1999). 
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, para. 1, 2; art. 18, para. 1. 
75. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 503. 
76. Id. at 507. 
77. Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDA W Universal: A Critique of CEDA W's Reservation 
Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. WASH. 
INT'L L. REV. 605, 624 (2002). 
78. Id. 
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other parties to the treaty. 79 
There are three agreements central to the practice of Shari' a 
in Nigeria. They are: the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), the 
Optional Protocol to CEDA W, and the Convention Against 
Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment ("CAT"). Nigeria is a member of CEDA W, a 
signatory of the Optional Protocol and a member of CAT. 80 
A. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women 
CEDA W entered into force on September 3, 1981.81 With one 
hundred sixty-eight member states, it is now the second most 
widely ratified human rights treaty, after the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 82 CEDA W began with the concern that, 
despite prior international agreements concerning human rights, 
extensive discrimination against women continued to exist. 83 
Article 5 of CEDA W calls for States to "modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women. " 84 Consequently, 
each member state is bound to take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that discrimination against women is eliminated in both the 
political and private life of the country. 85 Furthermore, CEDAW 
outlines internationally accepted rights applicable to all women 
including reproductive rights, the right to change nationality, 
equal access to healthcare, right to marry, right to vote, and the 
right to be free from exploitation. 86 It prescribes ways in which 
79. Id. 
80. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dec. 9, 2002 at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last modified Apr. 15, 2004). 
81. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/CEDAW/cedaw.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
82. Elizabeth Evatt, Finding a Voice for Women's Rights: The Early Days of CEDA W, 
34 GEO. WASH. lNT'L L. REv. 515, 516 (2002); See generally Malvina Halberstam, United 
States Ratification of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 
GEO. WASH. J. lNT'L. & EcoN.49 (1997); Sean D. Murphy, Senate Consideration ofCEDAW 
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 971 (2002) (discussing why the U.S. had thus far refused to join both 
CEDA W and the Optional Protocol). 
83. CEDA W, supra note 81, at Preamble. 
84. Id. art 5, sec. a. 
85. Id. art. VII. 
86. See generally AP, Ct. Upholds, supra note 10. 
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member states can effectuate the main purpose of CEDA W: to 
effectively end discrimination from both the public and private 
lives of women. 87 
In order to become a member state to CEDA W, each country 
must either sign and ratify, or accede to the treaty. 88 Signatories 
to CEDA W are obligated to refrain from acting in any way that 
would frustrate its object and purpose. 89 Upon ratification or 
accession, states are legally bound to put into practice the 
standards set forth in the text of the convention.90 Specifically, 
Article 2 of CEDA W states: 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all forms 
[and furthermore] take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise; 
and to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices, which 
constitute discrimination against women.91 
CEDA W further requires member states to submit a report 
within one year after ratification or accession, and then every four 
years thereafter detailing how the standards are being 
implemented within that country.92 
CEDAW represents a divergence from the generally accepted 
standard that government should not interfere with the private 
lives of their citizens.93 CEDA W recognizes the international 
right to privacy, yet not at the cost of equality.94 Member states to 
CEDA W recognize that women often need the most protection in 
their private sphere, especially in the areas of child bearing, child 
rearing, and marriage.95 Therefore, CEDA W respects customary 
practices and their expression, but does not allow them to act as a 
87. Michele Brandt, The Tension Between Women's Rights and Religious Rights: 
Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105, 106 
(1995-1996). 
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art 11 at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
89. Id. art. 19. 
90. Id. art 14-15. 
91. CEDA W, supra note 81, art. 2, secs. e-f. 
92. Id. art. 18. 
93. Eve McCabe, The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Law to Protect the 
Rights of Women as Illustrated by the Crises in Afghanistan, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 419, 428 (2000-2001). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 429. 
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means of denying women equal rights.96 
CEDA W defines "discrimination against women" as: 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field. 97 
Utilization of the term "effect" forgoes the need to prove 
discriminatory intent. 98 Therefore, a member state is in violation 
of CEDA W not only for intentional discrimination, but also for 
any action or inaction that leads to inequity in the treatment of 
men and women. 99 
B. The Optional Protocol 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of discrimination against Women [hereinafter the 
Protocol] presents an optimistic future for the enforcement of 
CEDA W .100 The Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on October 6, 1999 and it entered into force 
on December 22, 2000. 101 The purpose of the Protocol is to 
remedy past inconsistencies in the application of CEDA W by 
member states, and enhance the protections it affords to women. 102 
96. Id. 
97. CEDA W, supra note 81, art. 1. 
98. Kerri L. Ritz, Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy 
for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 25 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 191, 196 (2001). 
99. See generally Anne F. Bayefsky, The CEDAW Convention Today 94 AM. Soc'v 
INT'L L. PROC. 197 (2000) (discussing the CEDAW reporting process and its structural 
inadequacies); Aida Gonzalez Martinez Human Rights of Women 5 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 
157 (2001) (discussing generally the CEDAW and its impact on women's rights); Brad R. 
Roth, The CEDA W as a Collective Approach to Women 's Rights 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 187 
(2002). 
100. McCabe, supra note 93, at 433; See generally, Laboni Amena Hoq, The Women's 
Convention and its Optional Protocol: Empowering Women to Claim Their Internationally 
Protected Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 677 (2001) (comparing the rights identified 
in each CEDA W and the Protocol). 
101. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, 54th Sess. (1999) art. 2 [hereinafter 
Protocol] at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanarts/instree/cedawopprot-2000.html (last visited 
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An example of such enhancement on CEDA W is Article 2 of 
the Protocol, commonly referred to as the communications 
provision. 103 This section allows for individuals, or their 
representative, to bring claims for violations of any of the rights 
of the Convention. 104 This represents an enormous advantage for 
individuals over the rights allowed for by CEDA W, which only 
allowed for states to bring claims on behalf of their citizens. 105 
Because it is often the government of the state itself which either 
proactively, or inactively, supports the discrimination, it can be 
viewed as counterintuitive to allow only the state to bring a claim 
under CEDA W. In choosing to ratify the Protocol, states allow 
the CEDAW Committee to accept claims against them by one or 
more of their citizens. 
The CEDAW committee is comprised of individuals with 
expertise in the area of human rights, serving not as agents of the 
state but in their personal capacity .106 There are twenty-three 
members, all from different member states. 107 The 2003 
committee includes Fatima Kwaku of Nigeria. 108 The inquiry 
provision on the Protocol allows the Committee to "probe into 
situations of grave or systematic violations of reservations to any 
of its terms." 109 Article 5 of the Protocol allows for the 
Committee to request a state party to take interim measures 
necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of 
the alleged violation. 110 Therefore, an individual would not have 
to wait for relief pending resolution of their claim. However, the 
Committee will only consider the complaints after the complainant 
demonstrates that he exhausted all domestic remedies available. 111 
The Protocol establishes a system of review whereby the state 
party, after being found in violation of the Convention, may be 
visited and observed by the Committee and will have six months 
to respond as well as accepting the duty to keep the Committee 
103. Ritz, supra note 98, at 198. 
104. Protocol, supra note 101 art. 2. 
105. CEDA W, supra note 81, at art. 2. 
106. Members of the 2003 CEDA W Committee, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/members.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) 
[hereinafter CEDAW Committee]. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Ritz, supra note 98, at 199. 
110. CEDAW, supra note 81, at art.5. 
111. Id. 
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informed on its progress. 112 The greatest step forward taken by 
the Protocol is that parties may not enter reservations to any of its 
terms. 113 However, there is an opt-out clause whereby states can 
declare upon ratification or accession that they do not accept the 
inquiry procedure. 114 Although the adoption of this protocol is a 
significant step toward effectuating the goals of the Convention, 
it, like all international law, derives its force from the willingness 
of the state party to not only sign and ratify, but to comply 
without the threat of a concrete enforcement mechanism. 
C. The Convention Against Torture 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT") was adopted by 
the General Assembly on December 10, 1984.115 "Torture" is 
defined in Article 1 as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. 116 
Parties to CAT are bound to take all measures necessary to 
prevent acts of torture and are allowed no exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever. 117 CAT further effectuates the 
prohibition of torture by providing that no party may extradite a 
person to another state where they have substantial grounds for 
112. Protocol, supra note 101, at art. 8-9; See for example Report of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 27th Sess., 11 (Oct. 8, 2002), available 
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/27 sess.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
113. Ritz, supra note 98, at 199; See generally Barbara Cochrane Alexander, 
Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence 
Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 895 (2000); Andrea Montavon-McKillip, CAT Among 
Pigeons: The Convention Against Torture: A Precarious Intersection Between International 
Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 247 (2002) (discussing the 
domestic implications of CAT in the United States). 
114. Id. at FN 47, citing Protocol, supra note 101, art. 8-9. 
115. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984 [hereinafter CA 1]. 
116. Id. art. 1. 
117. Id. art. 2. 
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believing that the person would be in danger of being tortured. 118 
CAT also establishes the right for an individual who has been 
subjected to torture to bring a cause of action for compensation 
and rehabilitation, which is in addition to any cause of action 
arising under the national laws of that state. 119 
CAT established a Committee Against Torture to oversee the 
accordance of member states with the principles set forth within 
the treaty .120 The Committee has the right to investigate 
indications of systematic torture and report their findings to the 
United Nations Secretary General, who will in turn report to the 
General Assembly. 121 In the event that a state is found to be in 
violation of its duties under CAT and is unable to reach an 
agreement with the Committee, the General Assembly may 
sanction the state. 122 
Ill. NIGERIA'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
A. CEDAW 
As previously stated, Nigeria is a member of CEDA W and 
CAT and a signatory to the Protocol. Having ratified CEDA W 
and CAT, Nigeria has undertaken the legal obligations outlined by 
each treaty, and did so without reservation. 123 In ratifying 
CEDA W and CAT, Nigeria indicated to the international 
community that it was committed to effectuating the treaty 
domestically. 124 The obligation that Nigeria has under the 
Protocol as a signatory differs from that which it would have after 
ratification. Signature of a treaty by a state simply creates an 
obligation to refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty, and indicates the State's intention 
to be bound by the treaty at a later date. 125 Nigeria is, therefore, 
neither responsible for implementing the provisions of the 
118. Id. art. 3. 
119. CAT, supra note 115, art. 14. 
120. Id. art. 17. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. art. 20-21. 
123. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 14-15. 
124. U.N. Treaty Handbook, ch. 3, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) 
[hereinafter U .N. Handbook]. 
125. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 18. 
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Protocol, nor can citizens bring claims against the government to 
the Committee. 
Nigeria's last report to CEDAW was in 1998, prior to the 
formal implementation of Shari' a in the northern states. 126 In its 
report to CEDA W, the representative noted that traditional 
practices had a heavy impact on the implementation of CEDA W in 
rural areas. 127 The representative concluded that customary, 
traditional, and religious practices impeded the advancement of 
women, and that despite considerable progress, there was much 
work needed to gain equality between the sexes. 128 Based upon 
the Nigerian report the Committee made several findings and 
recommendations to Nigeria in order for them to further comply 
with their responsibilities under CEDA W. 
The Committee found the predominance of cultural 
stereotypes prejudicial to women in Nigeria present serious 
dangers to the physical and emotional health of women, violating 
their fundamental human rights. 129 "The coexistence of three legal 
systems, civil, religious and customary, makes it difficult to adopt 
and enforce laws which genuinely protect women's rights." 130 The 
committee was "very concerned" with the violation of women's 
human rights by religious and customary laws and practices in the 
family context and recommended that measures be taken to change 
laws and cultural norms allowing for such injustices as polygamy, 
one-sided repudiation, and unequal subsistence rights. 131 
Furthermore, the committee found that in spite of Nigeria's 
ratification of CEDA W without reservation, the Convention was 
not adequately implemented into the legal and constitutional 
framework. 132 
B. Reservations to CEDA W based upon Islamic Law 
Although Nigeria did not make reservations to CEDAW, 
126. Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and Compliance with 
International Legal Instruments on Women, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/country/compliancetbl.PDF. (last visited Apr. 10, 
2004). 
127. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 




131. Id. at 63. 
132. Report, supra note 127, at 63. 
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many other states where Shari' a is in practice have ratified 
CEDA W subject to the applicability of Islamic Law. Reservations 
are "unilateral statements, however phrased or named, made by a 
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to 
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect 
of certain provisions of the treaty in application to that State. " 133 
Parties make reservations when they wish to accept most of the 
obligations of the treaty but do not agree with a particular 
provision. 134 Reservations are therefore effective in enabling 
states to participate in multilateral treaties that they would 
otherwise be unwilling or unable to participate in. 135 In narrowly 
defining their obligation, reserving states avoid adhering to 
provisions they do not intend to implement, making them less 
accountable to the convention. 136 CEDA W has grown in 
membership numbers due to the ability of states to make broad 
reservations, therefore, giving it a worldwide membership. 137 
Despite the growth in membership numbers, CEDA W remains 
ineffective in many member states due to the power. of reservation, 
and the lack of enforcement mechanisms. 
Reservations to CEDA W cannot contradict "the object and 
purpose of the treaty." 138 When a state has made a reservation, 
other member states to CEDA W have the option of accepting the 
reservation either expressly, or impliedly; or "they can object to 
the reservation; or they can object and preclude the treaty from 
entering into force between them and the reserving state." 139 
Therefore, CEDA W member states have a great deal of 
subjectivity in determining their position with regards to a 
reserving state, despite the intention that it be an objective 
standard. 140 
133. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27,1980) art. 2, ~ 1, § d, cited in 
Riddle, supra note 76, at 605. 
134. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 73, at 132. 
135. U.N. Handbook, supra note 124. 
136. Riddle, supra note 77, at 618. 
137. Id. at 622. 
138. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 28; This stipulation on reservations stems from the 
ICJ advisory decision in the Genocide Convention Case 1951I.CJ.15. There the court held 
that states may ratify a treaty with reservation without assent by all member states of the 
reservation, and that all reservations to multilateral treaties should be evaluated to ensure 
that their reservation does not violate the defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 
139. Riddle, supra note 77, at 609; see also VCLT, supra note 189, arts. 18-23. 
140. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and The Convention 
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There are twelve states that made reservations to CEDA W 
contingent upon Shari' a. They are Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamariya, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. 141 An example 
of such a reservation is that which was issued by Egypt upon 
ratification and that states in pertinent part: "The Arab Republic 
of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article (2), 
provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic 
Shari'a."142 This reservation applies to Article 2 of CEDA W, 
which states: "States Parties condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms, agree to pursue, by all appropriate means 
and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women ... " 143 Germany, Mexico, Netherlands and Sweden all 
entered objections to the reservation made by Egypt, stating that it 
was contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty .144 Each of 
these four countries explicitly stated that, although it objected to 
the reservation, it did not render the treaty unenforceable between 
itself and Egypt. 145 
The general reservation made by Egypt to Article 2 of 
CEDA W allowed for Shari' a law to take precedence over the 
implementation of legislation to eradicate discrimination against 
women within Egypt. 146 Egypt escapes liability for violations 
under Article 2, as long as it can show that they were acting in 
accordance with Shari' a. 147 This reservation arguably undermines 
the object and purpose of the treaty, as the Committee called on 
States to re-examine their reservations to Article 2, stating that 
withdrawal of these reservations would indicate their strong 
commitment to achieving the full equality of women. 148 "The 
Convention allows States to commit themselves to women's 
on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 301 ( 1991 ). 
141. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
20th Session, 1999. 
142. CEDAW Reservations, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ englishintemetbible/partl/ chapterIV /treaty 10 .asp (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Reservations]. 
143. CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 2. 
144. Reservations, supra note 142. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. VCLT, supra note 88, art 21. 
148. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
20th Session, 1999, available at http://www.un.org/womanwatch/daw/cedaw/20thsess.htm 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
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equality, while simultaneously admitting they have no intention of 
granting women equality."149 This same hypocrisy exists in all 
treaties allowing reservations, perpetuating the constant struggle 
between enforcing international law and maintaining domestic 
sovereignty. 
The reservations made by States in correlation with Shari' a 
have been vigorously attacked by women's rights advocates 
around the world, as well as opposed by other members to 
CEDAW, and yet the reservations still stand. As Ann Elizabeth 
Mayer points out, the ongoing tension between Islamic and 
western culture is one reason for this dichotomy: 
Attempts to deter the practice for reservations in conflict with the 
object and purpose of CEDA W have met resistance in the form of 
accusations that these were tantamount to W estem attacks on Islam and 
or the Third World. An attempt made by the CEDA W committee in 
1987 to examine the basis for reservations that used Islam as the 
grounds for non-compliance ... resulted in a strong diplomatic backlash. 
Muslim countries quickly rallied to stop the project intimating that the 
CEDA W committee was engaged in cultural imperialism and attacking 
Islam. 150 
Reservations are not the sole cause for the ineffective nature 
of CEDA W and CAT. As previously stated, Nigeria entered both 
treaties without reservation, and yet the implementation of Shari' a 
in the northern states sentenced Amina Lawal to death by stoning. 
The lack of compelling sanctions and penalties for non-
compliance allow for state parties such as Nigeria to choose not to 
enforce its terms. 151 There is no effective enforcement mechanism 
to prevent Nigeria and other states from discriminating against 
women. 152 CEDA W does not authorize the Committee to find a 
state party in violation of its provisions, nor does it allow for 
situations to be redressed in a timely manner. 153 As a result, 
CEDA W has become more of a "statement of intent than a set of 
internationally binding obligations. " 154 
149. Julie A. Minor, An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 24 GA. J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 
137, 144 (1994). 
150. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A Benign Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid has been 
Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. lNT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 271 (2001). 
151. See Ritz, supra note 98, at 204. 
152. Id. at 205. 
153. Id. 
154. Clark, supra note 140, at 285-86. 
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C. The Protocol 
The Protocol does little to further promote the effectiveness 
of CEDA W. The Protocol applies only to States party to both 
CEDA W and the Protocol, thereby limiting its reach only to the 4 7 
party States who have ratified both documents. 155 Since 
ratification is optional, members of CEDA W are not required to 
sign or ratify the Protocol in order to maintain membership in 
CEDA W. State parties can "opt out" of Articles 8 and 9, 
precluding the Committee from investigating within a State 
against whom a complaint is filed. 156 Such a reservation 
eliminates the key advancement that the Protocol boasts, rendering 
it worthless. 
The Protocol is non-binding and failures to adhere to its terms 
are not sanctionable. 157 Once the Committee finds a State 
violative of its duties, its decision is merely advisory, and no 
mechanism exists to administer the recommendations made by the 
Committee in redressing the violation. 158 Therefore, the Protocol 
becomes another soft law addition to human rights jurisprudence 
with little discernable impact on the actions of member states. 
D. CAT 
Shari' a implementation in Nigeria also conflicts with the 
country's duties under CAT, which was ratified by Nigeria in June 
of 1991, following the implementation of Shari' a in the northern 
states. 159 The punishments called for by Shari' a include stoning to 
death, flogging, and amputation. 16° CAT applies where state 
officials inflict, consent, or acquiesce to torturous acts. 161 Under 
CAT, "[no] exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."162 
155. Clark, supra note 140, at 209. 
156. Ritz, supra note 98, at 210; Protocol, supra note 101. 
157. Id. at 211, citing Andre Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of 
Women: A Complaints Procedure for the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679 
at 766-67 (1996). 
158. See Protocol, supra note 101, art. 8-9. 
159. CAT Status of Ratification, at 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/conratification.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
160. J. Schacht, Law and Justice, CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, vol. II, pt. 
VIII/ch. 4 at 541. 
161. CAT, supra note 115, art. 1. 
162. Id. art. 2. 
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Inaction is viewed as action under CAT .163 Therefore, as long as 
the official government refuses to take action to prevent the 
occurrence of torture within the country, Nigeria is in violation of 
their duties despite the fact that Shari' a is not the official 
government of the state. 
E. Amina 's Rights under international Law 
CEDA W, the Protocol, and CAT provide citizens like Amina 
with enforceable rights within Nigeria. Under CEDA W, Nigeria 
has undertaken to prevent all forms of discrimination against 
women. 164 The failure of the Nigerian government to intervene in 
the implementation of a legal system such as Shari'a, which places 
value on female modesty and chastity and considers female 
sexuality threatening, seriously undermines the country's treaty 
obligations. 165 However, CEDA W allows for the member State, 
not the individual, to bring claims of discrimination. 166 A 
subcommittee then reports to the CEDAW committee and 
represents Amina. 167 The committee could then take the necessary 
steps toward ending discriminatorls practices such as the male 
dominance that Shari' a promotes. 1 8 The process is lengthy and 
further frustrated by Amina' s inability to bring the claim herself, 
instead having to rely on her government, whose inaction is at 
least partially responsible for the abridgement of her rights. As a 
consequence, Amina had little hope of invalidating her sentence 
under CEDAW. 
The Optional Protocol, once ratified, would give Amina the 
ability to bring a claim directly against the State to the 
committee. 169 The ability of the committee to take interim 
measures to avoid irreparable harm would have afforded Amina a 
stay to her execution while her situation was investigated. 170 If 
determined to be necessary, the committee would then have the 
163. Id. art. 1. 
164. CEDAW, supra note 81. 
165. Blake M. Guy, Female Genital Excisions and the Implications of Federal 
Prohibition, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 125, 142 (1995). 
166. See generally CEDAW, supra note 81, arts. 17-21; see also Fact Sheet No. 22, 
Discrimination Against Women: The Convention and Committee, at 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs22.htm#implementing (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Protocol, supra note 101, art. 2. 
170. Id. art. 5. 
21
Nicolai: Islamic Law and the International Protection of Women's Rights:
Published by SURFACE, 2004
320 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 31:2 
power to declare violations to the treaty and submit its outline for 
proposed changes to the Nigerian government. 171 Furthermore, the 
government would then have the opportunity to remedy the 
violations before the committee takes further actions, such as 
petitioning the U .N. General Assembly to impose economic 
sanctions. 172 Due to Nigeria's current signatory status, Amina's 
only hope under the Protocol was that the inaction taken by the 
Nigerian government classifies as frustrating the object and 
purpose of the treaty. 173 However, this is unlikely because Amina 
would have had to rely on the CEDA W administrative process, 
which stipulates that the State bring her claim. 174 Therefore, 
unless ratified, the Protocol offered little recourse to Amina. 
Under CAT, individual citizens of a State party have the right 
to bring complaints to the committee when their rights under the 
treaty have been threatened or abrogated. 175 For an individual to 
do so, the State must have expressly recognized the power of the 
Committee Against Torture to admit and examine individual 
communications. 176 Since Nigeria signed CAT in 1988 and did not 
ratify until 2001, it has yet to expressly recognize the Committee 
under article 21. As such, neither Amina nor her relatives or 
representatives may have entered a complaint regarding her 
impending execution. 177 Instead, Nigeria must have filed a 
complaint with the committee on her behalf. 178 CAT requires that 
all domestic remedies must be exhausted before invoking the 
protection that it affords. 179 
Amina had a far greater chance for success under CAT than 
under CEDA W or the Protocol. Having ratified the treaty in June 
2001, Nigeria is required to submit a report to the committee 
outlining how they intend to implement the treaty into their 
domestic legislation, as well as the steps that they have already 
171. Protocol, supra note 101, art 7-8. 
172. Id. art 9. 
173. VCLT, supra note 88, art. 12. 
174. CEDAW, supra note 81, arts. 17-21. 
175. CAT, supra note 115, at art. 22. 
176. Overview of the Procedure under the Convention Against Torture, available at 
http://193.l 94.138.l 90/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm. (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 
Procedure]. 
177. See generally CAT, supra note 115, art. 12-14, 21. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. art. 21(a). 
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towards achieving compliance within one year of ratification. 180 
Nigeria was scheduled to submit their report to the Committee in 
July 2002 but missed the deadline. 181 Compliance with CAT 
would require the Nigerian government to take affirmative steps to 
end the use of torture within the State. 182 By stepping in to 
prevent Amina's death by stoning, Nigeria would have effectuated 
the primary objectives of CAT, thus fulfilling their treaty 
obligations. Nigeria could then report its actions to the 
committee, and have met their treaty obligations to begin domestic 
prevention of torture and reporting on their progress. Therefore, 
the timeliness of Nigeria's ratification of CAT provided Amina 
with her greatest chance for protection under international law. 
IV. PROPOSED MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTUATING INTERNATIONAL 
0BLIGA TIONS 
International human rights laws can no longer exist as soft 
laws with little or no effective enforcement methods. A 
tremendous gap exists between what is theoretically guaranteed to 
women and what women actually experience around the world. 183 
On paper, women are free from discrimination in 168 countries. 184 
In each of those countries, legislation should be applied 
consistently, equalizing the rights of men and women. 185 In each 
CEDAW country, men and women should have equal property 
rights, marriage rights, parental rights, access to employment, and 
healthcare. 186 In reality, women continue to face discrimination in 
many ways throughout the CEDA W countries. 187 Reform is 
necessary to bridge the gap between guarantees and reality. To 
effectuate the provisions of CEDA W, the Protocol, and CAT, 
changes must be made regarding reservations, applicability, and 
180. Id. 
181. Report of the Committee Against Torture, 27th and 28th Sess. at 93, U.N. Doc. 
A/57 /44 (2002). 
182. CAT, supra note 115, art. 2. 
183. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459. 
184. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights, supra note 79. 
185. See CEDAW, supra note 81, art 2. 
186. Id. arts. 2-16. 
187. See generally Evatt, supra note 82; Ritz, supra note 98; Chantelle Forgues, Global 
Hurdle: The Implementation of an International Nondiscrimination Norm Protecting 
Women From Gender Discrimination in International Sports 18 B.U. INT'L L. J. 247 (2000); 
Mayer, supra note 150; Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights Under the 
Convention on the Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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enforcement. 
To ensure international peace and security, the United 
Nations has the rower to enforce the principles of its Charter upon 
non-members. 18 One of these principles is the "achievement of 
international cooperation .. .in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights ... without distinction as to ... sex." 189 In 
promoting this core principle, CEDA W should apply to members 
and non-members; thereby, encouraging non-members to the 
Convention and the Protocol to ratify both with limited 
opportunity for reservations. 
The reservation process must be refined to allow only for 
narrowly defined reservation to specific portions of the treaty.190 
The object and purpose of the treaty must be in the initial article, 
to which no country will be allowed reservations. Although 
preservation of religious laws and customs are the baseline for 
much ratification, the broad based reservations currently in 
existence severely undermine the purpose and effect of many 
treaties. 191 The restructuring of reservations will further 
CEDAW's goal to realign States' priorities in protecting religious 
sensibilities and women's rights.19 
The treaty monitoring process must be reformed to give the 
CEDA W Committee substantial power to oversee the compliance 
of member States. 193 More effective follow-up procedures as well 
as imminent repercussions for failure to meet report deadlines may 
lead to greater commitment of States to fulfill their obligations 
under CEDA W. 194 The Committee should have the power to 
overrule reservations that go against the object and purpose of the 
treaty .195 Furthermore, timetables must be implemented to ensure 
that justice is swift. The improved scheme outlined in the 
Protocol allows for six-month intervals between complaint, 
answer, and review of reported violations.196 
To better implement the provisions, CEDA W must be 
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. 
189. Id. art. 1, para. 3. 
190. Brandt, supra note 87, at 141. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Evatt, supra note 82, at 552-53. 
194. Id. at 553. 
195. Riddle, supra note 77, at 637. 
196. Protocol, supra note 101, art. 6. 
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amended to increase the number of committee members. The 
members would divide by geographic regions such as continents, 
and then further subdivided by regions. This will allow committee 
members to become familiar with the governments in their region, 
as well as their history of compliance with their responsibilities 
under the treaty. Such an expansion will also expedite the 
complaint process by allowing each committee to issue a ruling 
and assign damages. These smaller committees would also have 
the preliminary injunctive powers suggested under the Protocol. 
Where a threat of imminent harm is found to exist, the Committee 
could suspend the injurious action pending its review of the 
circumstances. The result would be faster and more effective 
functioning of the current committee with binding effect. 
Individuals or their representatives could petition the Committee 
at large and request an appeal from the decision of the sub-
committee, which the Committee could grant if substantive legal 
issues need to be addressed. 
Enforcement mechanisms must be installed to ensure 
compliance by State parties with CEDA W and the Protocol. 197 
The United Nations Security Council has the authority to extend 
economic and trade sanctions. 198 Sanctions are non-military 
measures used to influence nations to conform to some desired 
behavior or to punish a nation for violating international law .199 
Therefore, sanctions should be levied against signatory countries 
that consistently violate CEDA W.200 To avoid additional 
inconsistencies in application of sanctions, a detailed definition of 
what constitutes an egregious violation, as well as a three-strike 
system for warning a country of their violation, should be 
employed. 
Once a State party is found to consistently and egregiously 
violate their responsibilities under international human rights law, 
the corresponding committee should enter the country in order to 
monitor the government's actions. By allowing a team of 
committee members into the country, their presence will serve as a 
constant reminder to the leadership of their international 
197. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459. 
198. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
199. Joy K. Fausey, Does the United Nations Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect 
Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 
(1994). 
200. McCabe, supra note 93, at 459. 
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obligations, as well as their obligations to their own population. 
This team would work with the domestic lawmakers to design an 
enforcement scheme that compliments the needs of that particular 
country. The formulation of the team members will depend on the 
demographics of the country. For example, in Nigeria, members 
would have to be educated about the various aboriginal tribes, the 
history of political turmoil, the current government as well as 
Shari' a Law. Such a system would work toward a solution by 
understanding the problem, and respecting the culture and 
civilization of that sovereign state. Although the Nigerian 
government has failed to take action to stop the violations of its 
citizens' human rights, it has not actively supported the 
mistreatment. 
Where the domestic government has continuously tried and 
failed to ensure the human rights of its population, a third party 
would be most beneficial in providing a fresh approach to finding 
a solution. This resident team approach would likely not be 
successful in countries where the government is itself committing 
the violations and continuously refusing to remedy their actions. 
In situations such as that, economic sanctions or occupation by 
U.N. forces may be more effective. 
These proposed steps are a far cry from ensuring international 
equal rights to women. What they represent are a series of small 
steps that will lead the global community in the direction that 
CEDA W, the Protocol and CAT prescribe. At the least, the grant 
of broad reservation powers must cease, regardless of the cultural, 
religious, or moral foundations upon which they purport to rest. 
For Nigeria, these steps would likely cause a great deal of internal 
conflict, as made clear by the incessant violence, riots, and civil 
war plaguing the country on a daily basis. 
As evidenced by the Miss World pageant, a great deal of 
tension exists between the Muslim north and the Christian south in 
Nigeria. 201 It is likely that once faced with the possibility of 
sanctions, or even a trade embargo, Nigeria would quickly react to 
the suggestions of the CEDA W Committee.202 Nigeria's entire 
201. See AP, Miss World Leaves Nigeria, supra note 62. 
202. For a discussion on the effectiveness of sanctions, see Richard W. Parker, The 
Problem with Scorecards: How (And How Not) To Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of 
Economic Sanctions, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 235 (2000); see also Joy K. Fausey, Does the 
United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own 
Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193; see also Cassandra LaRae-Perez, 
Economic Sanctions As a Use of Force: Re-evaluating the Legality of Sanctions From an 
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economy is dependent upon the exportation of oil, as the sixth 
largest producer of petroleum in the world.203 It also has no 
operating oil refineries and must import gasoline. 204 The current 
civil unrest prompted a recent thirty percent cutback in oil 
production by Chevron.205 Chevron's cutback has received 
international attention and provoked the government to take 
further military action in order to control the situation. 206 
This reaction by the government illustrates that the threat of 
economic or trade sanctions would likely impact their decision to 
react to the enforcement of Shari'a law within Nigeria. Once the 
government took positive steps to ensure that torturous 
punishments are no longer used and that justice is delivered 
without attention to gender, the international community would 
view Nigeria as attempting to fulfill their international 
commitments. This compliance may come at the enormous cost of 
peace within the country as the Islamic north and Christian south 
collide over the tension between religious freedom and human 
equality. However, forced compliance with international treaties 
will no doubt also come at a price to Nigeria, one which may 
hinder their ability to enter into future treaties for fear of the 
domestic consequences, but that cannot bar the enforcement of 
international human rights for women. 
CONCLUSION 
Amina Lawal' s life may have been saved by international 
pressure forcing Nigeria into compliance with CEDA W and CAT, 
yet the battle for women's rights would have scarcely begun. In 
Nigeria, or any predominantly Islamic country, women face daily 
struggles against sexist regimes cloaked in religious tradition. 
Outside the Islamic faith, women struggle to overcome the same 
history of diminution and male dominance. 
The global community has identified discrimination against 
women as a threat to international peace and progress. The result 
of this realization is CEDA W and the Protocol. Each reflects a 
worldwide commitment to ending the disparity between the sexes. 
Each treaty is inadequate not for a lack of vision, but for a lack of 
Effects-Based Perspective, 20 B.U. INT'L L. J. 161 (2002). 
203. Starr, supra note 36, at 390. 
204. Id. 
205. AP, Oil Crises, supra note 55. 
206. Id. 
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enforcement. 
The international community must respond to the enduring 
crisis that is soft law. The treaty process must be revised to 
include enforcement mechanisms that deliver quick, consistent 
outcomes. Reservations must be narrowly tailored and granted 
only if consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Committees created to effectuate the goals of treaties must be 
given the power to adjudicate complaints and assign reparation. 
These committees must have injunctive powers to prevent the 
possibility of further injury to complainants during their period of 
review. Changes such as those proposed here are vital to the 
future of the international community. A baseline for human 
rights for women must be universally accepted and enforced to 
prevent future loss of life. Action must be taken to ensure 
equality. Thousands of lives, like that of Amina, depend on it. 
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